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Abstract
Current prevention techniques provide restrictive re-
sponses that may take a local reaction in a limited infor-
mation system infrastructure. In this paper, an in depth
and comprehensive approach is introduced for responding
to intrusions in an efficient way. This approach considers
not only the threat and the architecture of the monitored
information system, but also the security policy. The pro-
posed reaction workflow links the lowest level of the infor-
mation system corresponding to intrusion detection mech-
anisms, including misuse and anomaly techniques, and ac-
cess control techniques with the higher level of the security
policy. This reaction workflow evaluates the intrusion alerts
at three different levels, it then reacts against threats with
appropriate counter measures in each level accordingly.
1 Introduction
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are widely used to
secure information systems, and became a primary compo-
nent in modern security architecture solutions. Different in-
trusion detection techniques have been introduced and im-
plemented in the governmental, academic and commercial
information systems. Moreover, Intrusion Prevention Sys-
tems (IPSs) are highly used along with the IDSs to counter
the detected threats. However, current intrusion prevention
devices act only as conventional firewalls with the ability
to block, terminate or redirect the traffic when the corre-
sponding intrusion event is triggered. In other words, the
intrusion response is statically associated with one (or sev-
eral) intrusion event(s). Nevertheless, in [11] where the a
contextual security policy have been defined, a policy reac-
tion formalism was introduced. This reaction is performed
globally allowing a global access control modification in an
organization. However, the scalability remains an open is-
sue that was not addressed in [11]. The threat context mech-
anism was implemented as a set of contextual rules that are
triggered when the corresponding threat contexts become
active. Only access control rules, i.e. permissions and pro-
hibitions, were considered. We note that prohibitions and
permissions are not appropriate to launch some actions, for
instance shutting down a server immediately, or redirecting
undesirable traffic (e.g syn-flooding packets)
On the other hand, the anti-correlation approach [4] al-
lows an easiest manner to express the reaction activation
along with the scalability consideration. However, the reac-
tion within this approach is performed locally without tak-
ing into account the global framework where it is imple-
mented. This issue motivated us to improve the contextual
security policy not only by using the permissions and prohi-
bitions, but also by focusing on obligations corresponding
to actions that are inherent within the whole reaction policy
framework. Another objective of our work is to combine in
a coherent manner both approaches within a reaction work-
flow, taking into account different levels of reactions.
A system oriented taxonomy is presented in [20] with a
classification into degree of automation and activity of trig-
gered response. The automatic response is organized by
ability to adjust, time of response, cooperation ability and
response selection method. This taxonomy and others (not
presented here due to space limitation) do not describe a
thorough description of the response including the response
strategy, duration, effectiveness and impact of the response.
Toth and Kruegel [21] propose a cost sensitive approach
that balances between intrusion damage and response cost
in order to choose a response with the least impact. Lee et
al. [14] also discuss the need to consider the cost of intru-
sions damage, the cost of manual and automated response
to an intrusion, and the operational cost, which measures
constraints on time and computing resources.
In this paper, we propose an auto-adaptive model that
starts from the security policy management of the moni-
tored information system. The low level tools including
intrusion detection and access control mechanisms that are
implemented locally to monitor the information system, are
configured according to the high level security specifica-
tions. Then, whenever it is necessary, some of the generated
alerts are forwarded to the upper level , by crossing differ-
ent levels of reaction. At the upper level, and accordingly
to the detected threat, an evaluation of the current system
state takes place. Consequently, either direct responses will
launched or the whole security policy will be changed. We
define three reaction levels; (1) low level reaction, (2) in-
termediate level reaction, and (3) high level reaction. Each
level considers particular security requirements and deploys
appropriate security components and mechanisms to react
against the detected threats.
The rest of the paper is organized as the following. Sec-
tion 2 presents the reaction requirements and the reaction
policy expression. In particular, we develop our approach to
manage the conflicts between the various operational, mini-
mal constraints and contexts of threats. Section 3 describes
the reaction deployment framework. Section 4 presents the
architecture of the reaction workflow with the different re-
action levels. Section 5 presents an illustrative VoIP use
case. Finally, Section 6 presents future work and concludes
the paper.
2 Reaction policy
We view a security policy as a set of requirements cor-
responding to permissions, prohibitions and obligations. In
the security literature, it is generally considered that these
requirements apply to users or processes (i.e. subjects)
when they access to resources (i.e. objects) in order to exe-
cute services or programs (i.e. actions). The security policy
includes requirements that apply in “normal” situations, i.e.
when no intrusion occurs. We call this part the operational
policy, and it typically includes access control requirements.
The reaction policy is another part of the policy which
specifies security requirements that are activated when an
intrusion is detected. It is a set of rules that specify what
happens in case of violation (or attempt of violation) of
some requirements of the operational security policy. Ac-
cording to these (attempts of) violations and their impacts
on the target information system, new permissions, prohi-
bitions or obligations are activated and pushed into the ap-
propriate security components. For instance, if an intrusion
occurs, and the alert diagnosis identifies the path of the at-
tack or the targeted equipment pieces by this attack and used
to reach the intrusion objectives, (1) some packet flows have
to be rejected or at least redirected or, (2) some of the vul-
nerable equipment used by the attack have to be stopped or
at least isolated to contain its spread in the whole system.
Our approach to specify the security policy is based
on the an Organizational Based Access Control (OrBAC)
model [8]. In the remainder of this section, we shall first
recall the basic principles of the OrBAC model, then we
present how this model can be used to express the reac-
tion policy. Finally we address the issue of security require-
ments conflicts.
2.1 The OrBAC model
The security policy specification is based on an expres-
sive security model, the OrBAC model. One of the Or-
BAC contributions is the abstraction of the traditional triples
〈subject, action, object〉 into 〈role, activity, view〉. The
entities subject, action and object are called concrete enti-
ties whereas the entities role, activity and view are called
organizational entities. A view is a set of objects that pos-
sess the same security-related properties within an organi-
zation thus these objects are accessed in the same way. Ab-
stracting them into a view avoids the need to write one rule
for each of them. Another useful abstraction is that of ac-
tion into activity. An activity (e.g. consult data) is consid-
ered as an operation which is implemented by some actions
defined in the organization (e.g. read for a file and select
for a database). This is why they can be grouped within
the same activity for which we may define a single security
rule. One of the main contributions of the OrBAC model
is that it can model context that reduces the applicability of
the rules to some specific circumstances [8]. Thus, context
is another organizational entity of the OrBAC model. The
OrBAC model defines four predicates1:
• empower: empower(s, r) means that subject s is em-
powered in role r.
• consider: consider(α, a) means that action α imple-
ments the activity a.
• use: use(o, v) means that object o is used in view v.
• hold: hold(s, α, o, c) means that context c is true be-
tween subject s, action α and object o.
Security requirements are specified in OrBAC by quin-
tuples:
• SR(decision, role, activity, view, context)
which specifies that the decision (i.e. permission, prohibi-
tion or obligation) is applied to a given role when request-
ing to perform a given activity on a given view in a given
context. We call these organizational security rules. An
example of such a security rule is:
− SR(permission, private host,
open HTTP, to Internet, default)
which corresponds to a filtering requirement specifying that
hosts assigned to the role private host are permitted to open
HTTP connection with the Internet in the default context
(the default context is true every circumstance).
1In OrBAC, the organization is made explicit in every predicate but
here, to simplify, the organization is left implicit since we consider always
only one organization.
Another requirement may correspond to the following
prohibition:
− SR(prohibition, any host, send IP packet,
same source destination, default)
where any host is a role assigned to every network host,
send IP packet is the activity of sending IP packets,
same source destination is a view that contains any IP
packet with a source IP address equal to its destination IP
address. This is actually a security requirement to protect
the system against the Land attack.
As suggested in the RBAC model [18], the organi-
zational entity role is associated with a hierarchy called
sub role and security requirements are inherited through
this hierarchy. In the OrBAC model, similar hierarchies to
the three other organizational entities had been assigned:
view, activity and context.
2.2 Using OrBAC to specify a reaction
policy
The reaction policy corresponds to security requirements
that are activated when intrusions occur. In OrBAC, this
is modelled using special contexts called threat contexts.
For this purpose, intrusion classes are associated with threat
contexts. Threat contexts are activated when intrusions are
detected, and are used to specify the reaction policy. The
activation of these contexts leads to the instantiation of the
policy rules in response to the considered threat. For in-
stance, a Syn-flooding attack is reported by an alert with
a classification reference equal to CVE-1999-0116, the tar-
get corresponds to some network Host and some Service.
Then the synflooding context is specified as follows [11]:
− hold( , Service,Host, syn flooding)←−
alert(Time, Source, Target, Classification),
reference(Classification,′ CV E−1999−0116′),
service(Target, Service), hostname(Target,Host).
Notice that, since the intruder is spoofing (masquerad-
ing) its source address in a Syn-flooding attack, the subject
corresponding to the threat origin is not instantiated in the
hold predicate. When an attack occurs and a new alert is
launched by the intrusion detection system, new hold facts
are derived for threat context Ctx. Therefore, Ctx is then
active and the security rules associated with this context are
triggered to react to the intrusion.
Notice also that we need to define a process that maps
the intrusion detection alerts onto the hold predicate. In
the above syn flooding example, this mapping is volun-
tary simplified. As shown in [11], it is generally more com-
plex because we need a mapping that has variable granu-
larity, to take into account the different scope of different
attacks. For example, a distributed denial-of-service on all
areas of the network needs to be handled differently than a
targeted brute-force password-guessing attack. By appro-
priately defining the triples 〈subject, action, object〉 that
are in the scope of a given threat context, it is possible to
define such variable context granularity. As suggested in
[11], a first form of reaction would be to update the access
control policy by activating and deploying new permissions
or prohibitions. For instance, a rule:
− R3: permission(private host, open TCP,
to hostObelix, default)
might be replaced by a new one such as:
− R4: prohibition(any host, open TCP,
to hostObelix, syn flooding).
In the second case, a reaction requirement may be speci-
fied by means of obligations. We may actually consider two
different kinds of obligations called server-side obligation
and client-side obligation. A server-side obligation must
be enforced by the security components controlled by the
security server and generally corresponds to immediate
obligations. R5 is an example of such rules expressed in
the OrBAC model:
− R5: obligation(mail daemon, stop,
mailserver, imap threat)
Client side obligations generally correspond to obligations
that might be enforced after some delay. Several papers
have already investigated this problem and suggested
models to specify obligation with deadlines [7, 12]. For
instance, if there is an intrusion that attempts to corrupt an
application server by a Trojan Horse intrusion, then this
server must be quarantined by the administrator within
a deadline of 10s. R6 provides a specification of this
requirement:
−R6: deadline obligation(administrator, quarantine,
application server, trojan horse threat, before(10))
where deadline obligation can be used to specify one
more attribute that corresponds to the deadline condition
before(10).
Obligations with deadline are more complex to enforce
than immediate obligation. So, to simplify both the expres-
sion and implementation, we shall only consider immediate
server-side obligations in the remainder of this paper.
2.3 Security requirements interpretation
Concrete security rules that apply to triples
〈subject, action, object〉 are modelled using the predi-
cate sr(decision, subject, action, object) and logically
derived from organizational security rules by the general
derivation rule:
RG: SR(Decision,R, V,A,C) ∧
empower(Subject, R)∧
consider(Action,A) ∧ use(Object, V )∧
hold(Subject, Action,Object, C)
→ sr(Decision, Subject, Action,Object)
When the security policy contains both permissions, pro-
hibitions and obligations, conflicts between security re-
quirements are inevitable. We can actually consider three
different types of conflicts:
Contradiction: A contradiction occurs when it is possi-
ble to derive, for some subject, action and object, both
sr(permission, s, a, o) and sr(prohibition, s, a, o).
Dilemma: A dilemma occurs when it is possible
to derive, for some subject, action and object, both
sr(obligation, s, a, o) and sr(prohibition, s, a, o).
Inability: An inability occurs when it is possible to derive,
for some subject and object, both sr(obligation, s, a1, o)
and sr(obligation, s, a2, o) and it is impossible to simulta-
neously execute both actions a1 and a2. For example, a1 is
the action stop a server and a2 is the action start a server.
However, the approach suggested in the OrBAC model
[6] does not include the detection of concrete permissions,
prohibitions or obligations conflicts; but it provides means
to detect and manage potential conflicts between organi-
zational rules. The solution to manage contradictions and
dilemmas actually differs from the one used to manage in-
abibility.
Management of contradictions and dilemmas. A poten-
tial contradiction (resp. dilemma) exists between an organi-
zational permission (resp. an organizational obligation) and
an organizational prohibition if these two rules may possi-
bly apply to the same subject, action and object. The ap-
proach used to manage such conflicts is based on the def-
inition of separation constraints assigned to organizational
entities. A separation constraint assigned to two roles spec-
ifies that a given subject cannot be empowered in these two
roles. Separation constraints for activities, views and con-
texts are similarly defined.
Thus, a potential contradiction between two organiza-
tional security rules is defined as follows (potential dilemma
is similarly defined):
Definition: Potential contradiction. Two secu-
rity rules SR(permission, r1, a1, v1, c1) and
SR(prohibition, r2, a2, v2, c2) are potentially con-
flicting if role r1, activity a1, view v1 and context c1 are
respectively not separated from role r2, activity a2, view v2
and context c2.
Management of inability. Potential inability is managed
using constraints assigned to activities called antinomic
constraints. We say that two activities are antinomic if it is
not possible to execute these two activities simultaneously.
Of course, we can use antinomic constraints to manage in-
ability because there is no inability between two organiza-
tional obligations if these obligations are associated with
antinomic activities.
Combining separation and antinomic constraints, we can
now detect every potential conflict. Priorities should be as-
sociated with such potentially conflicting security rules in
order to avoid situations of real conflict. Prioritization of
security rules must proceed as follows [6]: (1) Detection of
potentially conflicting rules, (2) Assignment of priority to
potentially conflicting rules.
Notice that this process is tractable because each time
a new potential conflict is detected, the administrator can
decide to insert a new constraint or define a new priority.
Notice also that this process must be performed off-line, i.e.
before the security policy is actually deployed. We then
obtain a set of partially ordered security rules SR(decision,
role, activity, view, context, priority). Concrete security
rules can be derived from the abstract security rules and are
assigned with the same priority. It has been proved in pre-
vious works [6] the following theorem.
Theorem: If every potential conflict is solved, then no con-
flict can occur at the concrete level.
2.4 Strategies to manage conflicts
We observe that most of reaction requirements are in
conflict with access control requirements, i.e. the access
control policy may specify a permission whereas the reac-
tion policy specifies a conflicting prohibition that applies
when an intrusion is detected. For instance, HTTP is per-
mitted when there is no intrusion but prohibited if an in-
trusion on the HTTP protocol is detected. These conflicts
can be solved by manually assigning priorities between re-
quirements as suggested in the previous section. However,
it is easier to automatically solve these conflicts by assign-
ing higher priority to the reaction requirement than to access
control requirements. In fact, we consider three different
types of activation contexts: threat, operational and mini-
mal.
The operational contexts aim at describing traditional
operational policy [8]. They may correspond to temporal,
geographical or provisional contexts (i.e. contexts that de-
pend on the history of previous executed actions). Since
access control requirements are associated with operational
contexts whereas reaction requirements are associated with
threat contexts, we actually consider that threat contexts
have higher priority than operational contexts.
However, there are some security requirements such as
availability requirements that must be preserved even if an
intrusion occurs. For instance, the access to the email server
must be preserved even if some intrusions occur. This
is modelled as a minimal requirement. Minimal contexts
then define high priority exceptions in the policy, describ-
ing minimal operational requirements that must apply even
in case of characterized threat.
Therefore, we consider two parameters to manage con-
flicting situations called criticality and specificity. A criti-
cality parameter is used to assess context priority between
the three defined categories of contexts operational, threats
and minimal. We define an operator Łc to assess the level
of criticality of contexts, so that if Ctx is a set of well
formed contexts: Lc: Ctx −→ {ope, threat, min} with
ope < threat < min. We define the criticality relation
as follows: c1 <c c2 ←→ Lc1 < Lc2. We consider
also a specificity parameter that deals with inheritance and
context composition, hierarchical specificity context inher-
itance. For instance, we say that c2 is more specific than
c1 if sub context(c2, c1). We define specificity for con-
texts as follows: c1 ≤s c2 ←→ sub context(c2, c1) and
c1 <s c2 ←→ c1 ≤s c2∧¬(c1 = c2). We have then defined
two strategies to assess rule priorities in case of potential
conflicts and prove that they are not conflicting strategies,
that is we never obtain conflicting decisions when applying
them (see [11]).
3 Deployment of the reaction workflow
In Section 2, we gave an overview of the OrBAC model
and how to manage the different contexts for a mapping
with the current threats and how to resolve the conflicts be-
tween the security rules according to the active threat con-
texts. Deploying the reaction policies within a comprehen-
sive framework needs the definition of each module and its
function within the framework. The workflow model must
also provide an abstract and global view of the security pol-
icy. This is the purpose of the Policy Instantiation Engine
(PIE) to manage the global security policy. The PIE will
have to clearly separate the global policy from its imple-
mentation in the PEPs (Policy Enforcement Points). In par-
ticular, the conflicts are to be solved at the abstract level
before generating PEPs configurations. The PIE activates
threat contexts and extracts a new security policy using the
threat information triggered by the ACEs (Alert Correla-
tion Engine) [11]. Concrete security rules are then sent by
the PIE to two different modules. The rules corresponding
to permissions and prohibitions are sent to the PDP (Pol-
icy Decision Point) that dispatches the policy according to
PEPs realms and capabilities, and translates the policy rules
to PEP-specific scripted commands. Notice that these PEPs
correspond to security components such as IDSs and fire-
walls. Rules corresponding to obligations, are sent to an-
other component called RDP (Reaction Decision Point) that
translates the corresponding rules, such as shutting down an
HTTP server or redirecting an undesired traffic generated
by the syn-flooding attack, into REP (Reaction Enforcement
Points) capabilities.
Figure 1 presents the components of the reaction work-
flow with the different links and information exchange be-
tween these modules. We describe, in the following, the
different modules and their functions and goals within the
suggested reaction workflow deployment framework. The
inputs, outputs, configurations and functions of the differ-
ent modules are summarized in Table 1.
Security policy management. This module describes two
different data types. The first deals with the security ob-
jectives that are specified as a set of security states. The
violated states are then derived using the security objec-
tives defined within the security policy management. These
security objectives are expressed using a predefined set of
LAMBDA predicates (due to space limitation, we do not
develop more this point in this paper) [10]. Such violated
states are then used by different modules. In particular, the
ACE uses these violated objectives in order to provide a
global diagnosis of the current attack scenario performed
by the attackers. The second data type deals with the pol-
icy definition where two kinds of security rules are distin-
guished:(1) permissions or/and prohibitions and (2) obliga-
tions. Notice that while the instantiated access control pol-
icy rules are pushed by the PIE to the PDP the obligations
rules are pushed to the RDP.
System management. This module includes the opera-
tional context data and the topology information. The work-
ing hours context is an example of operational context data.
These contexts may be combined with threat contexts (see
section 2.4) and are used by the PIE to activate the right
security rules. The information topology part describes
the topology of the information system under monitoring
such as information about network nodes (routers, servers,
etc.), security components (IDSs, Firewalls, etc.) and so on.
RDPs and PDPs use the topology information provided by
the system management for appropriate reactions and PEPs
and REPs components choice decisions.
Alert Correlation Engine (ACE). Generally, information
produced by detection intrusion probes cannot be consid-
ered on their own. Indeed, this information actually comes
from many sources and with different formats (ex: a Snort
alert, a Netfilter firewall log, etc.). Moreover, there is a
strong need for alerts volume reduction, semantics improve-
ment and attacker recognition. Alert correlation, preceded
by alert aggregation and fusion, aims at realizing these
tasks, thus permitting false positives reduction and produc-
ing meta-alerts offering a better semantics and severity lev-
els for more efficient analysis. The ACE constructs ongoing
attack scenarios according to the alerts generated by the sen-
sors. We use a semi-explicit ACE as suggested by CRIM
(http://www.crim-platinum.org/). Note that other ACEs,
such as that presented in [15], may be also used within our
workflow. This correlation engine uses a description of el-
ementary attacks in the LAMBDA language [10] to con-
struct ongoing scenarios according to the alerts generated
by the sensors. The security objectives are defined in the
policy management level and are taken into consideration
by the ACE to detect any violations of these objectives. No-
tice that an explicit ACE can also be used. However, by
contrast to a semi-explicit ACE, it cannot handle alerts gen-













































Figure 1. Reaction workflow deployment.
Table 1. Functions of the different modules.
Module Input Output Configuration Function
ACE idmef messages idmef messages External security
reference databases
Verify and update information in idmef
messages for threat assessment.
PIE idmef messages Policy rules Policy and context
definitions
Activate threat contexts. Extract a new se-
curity policy from the active contexts.





Reinforce the Immediate Reaction with an
accurate diagnosis, an impact assessment
and a larger choice of possible reactions.
Decide on the appropriate reaction and
activate reactions according to the REP-
specific.
PDP Policy rules Config scripts Policy to script
translation rules
Segment the policy according to PEP
realms and capabilities, and translate the




Reaction actions Launch the reaction orders received from
the RDP in the case of the short term reac-
tion and from PEPs in the case of immedi-
ate reaction.
PEP Config scripts idmef messages Apply the configuration script that imple-
ments the security policy.
new attacks. The correlated alerts are then sent to the PIE
for global reaction and to the RDP for appropriate decision
on the possible reaction instances.
Policy Instantiation Engine (PIE). The security policy is
specified by a set of rules whose activation depends on con-
textual data. Thus, a PIE has two major functions: (1) acti-
vate contexts which (2) trigger re-evaluation of the security
policy (abstract rules). The PIE manages conflict resolution
at the policy evaluation level to produce a consistent set of
policy instances (concrete rules) to deploy. As suggested
in section 2.3 conflict resolution is ensured at the abstract
level; i.e. the conflicts are detected and resolved by exam-
ining abstract security rules and defining a partial order re-
lationship between conflicting rules.
Policy Decision Point (PDP). It is the element where se-
curity policy decisions are made. Policies instantiated by
the PIE according to threat contexts are transmitted to one
or more PDPs. When it receives a policy instance, in our
case an OrBAC concrete rule (permission or prohibition),
a PDP has to map each policy instance onto concrete ac-
tions to enforce the policy on PEPs. A PDP thus has to be
aware of its PEPs, so that it can translate first the rules into
generic configurations, considering the kind of PEP (e.g. a
firewall), and then the generic configurations into specific
configurations, depending on the PEP implementation (e.g.
a “Netfilter” firewall) [5]. Note that part of the decisional
capability of the PDP relies on the fact that a given concrete
policy rule may provide different actions on the PEPs. For
instance, depending on the architecture of the information
system, reconfiguring access to mail user accounts may be
realized on the service itself, (e.g. pop3 service native con-
figuration files) in the case of dedicated services, or at the
infrastructure level (e.g. reconfiguration of Active Direc-
tory) in the case of federated services environment. A PDP
should choose the most appropriate PEPs under its view re-
lying on topology information made available.
Reaction Decision Point (RDP). The RDP decides which
reactions should be triggered according to the attack scenar-
ios received from the ACE. It has all the topology informa-
tion of the network it is charged to react on. It manages the
obligation activations received from the PIE without con-
flicting with the minimal security policy. The obligations
are expressed as OrBAC concrete rules. The reaction deci-
sion is taken by considering the topology information of the
monitored system, the reaction obligations and the impact
of the elected reactions [13]. A diagnosis is also sent by the
RDP to the PIE and handled at the high reaction level.
Policy Enforcement Point (PEP). The PEPs are the ele-
ments that enforce security policy decisions. They are fed
with new policy instances that are translated and then sent
by the PDP. Expressing new policies may have implications
on different PEPs. For instance, an attack targeting a server
may lead to a reaction which involves both the server (stop-
ping the service) and a firewall (blocking the corresponding
port). Each selected PEP for a policy instance is sent a con-
figuration script considering both its type (for example IDS)
and its implementation (such as Snort). In this architecture,
we suggest not to create a distinction between PEP and sen-
sors, but to consider that sensors are a special type of PEPs.
Reaction Enforcement Point (REP). This module
launches the reactions either immediately or after receiv-
ing a reaction activation from the RDP. It can also activate
an immediate reaction that might be embedded in the alert
signature. In this case, an immediate reaction is directly ac-
tivated and launched by the REP. We notice that a PEP and
REP have two different functions and may be implemented
in the same software of hardware device.
4 Reaction workflow architecture
Figure 1 presents the workflow deployment including the
different modules. Three different reaction levels coping
with the security requirements are determined in this frame-
work; low level, mid level and high level reaction. In the
following we describe the implementation and configura-
tion of each level.
4.1 Low level reaction
We define low level reaction as the action that is possible
to execute automatically just after an intrusion is detected.
In the reaction policy, this corresponds to an obligation to
immediately execute this action. We should note here that
the reaction must be consistent with the minimal security
policy. For example, if a service should be active for any cir-
cumstance then a reaction, which consists in stopping this
service, should not be launched. Different immediate reac-
tions may be activated. For example, the Snort IDS tool of-
fers different manners to respond to an alert. The following
signature is an example of such a reaction: alert tcp any any
<> 192.168.1.0/24 80 (content: “ bad.html”; msg: “Not
for children!”; react:block). A security officer may either
add a tcp-reset option specified directly in the correspond-
ing rule or use the inline snort capability that is interfaced
with iptables hence permitting to drop the packet. However,
we argue that the inline option is more appropriate since it
does not let the targeted party receive the malicious packet
when a drop option is used. The DDoS [2] architecture is
a good example of this situation when the agents are re-
ceiving the order to flood the victim and the reaction only
consists in resetting the corresponding connection between
the masters and the agents.
The REP and PEP are two modules involved in the low
level reaction (Figure 2(a)). The PEP in this level detects
the intrusion while the REP performs a direct reaction over
the detected intrusion. In this case, the REP and PEP are
implemented in the same device. For the snort rule example
presented above, a reaction that consists in blocking a for-
bidden website is launched once the “bad.htm” content is
seen. We notice that the low level reaction rules are config-
ured by the different scripts issued from the PDP. However,
whether a counter measure is effective at this level is not
a shortcoming for the global security vision since the other
two reaction types at the upper architecture levels look for
an in-depth reaction.
4.2 Mid level reaction
The low reaction defines an appropriate reaction which
is generally specified within a signature. At the mid level,
intrusion alerts and the different immediate reaction infor-
mation coming from the lower level are used as an input for
aggregation, fusion and correlation functions CRIM in or-
der to construct a local ongoing attack scenario that follows
the steps of an attacker(s) and determine his objective(s).
These functions are performed by the ACE (Figure 2(b))
using a semi-explicit correlation mechanism [9].
However, at the mid level, we do not push reactions cor-
responding to obligations explicitly specified in the reac-
tion policy. Instead, anti-correlation [4] is used as a way to
find automatically a set of counter measures in order to stop
not elementary actions but the global attack scenario. Some
correlation and fusion tools, implemented during the last
decade, provide a set of counter measures that may be ei-
ther activated automatically or let the administrator choose
the appropriate ones for security agility considerations [16].
Notice that a diagnosis is derived within this step for im-
proving the reaction process. Activating an automatic or
a manual response depends on the confidence level of the
diagnosis and the automatic choice may be performed by
measuring the impact of the corresponding reaction [13].
4.3 High level reaction
The mid level reaction takes advantage of the low level
reaction actions and the selected reactions to stop ongoing
attack scenarios. However, these two reaction levels do not
consider an in depth revision of the global security. This
suggested the introduction of the high level reaction that
aims to evolve the security policy of the monitored sys-
tem according to the current threat. The first input data
at this reaction level corresponds to the correlation and in-
termediate reaction alerts emanating from the intermediate
reaction level. A global diagnosis is drawn using these in-
put data. Using the global security policy and the differ-
ent threat and operational contexts, contextual policy rules
are applied when the corresponding contexts become active.
Therefore three functions, should be performed at this level;
activating contexts [11], triggering generic policy rules ac-




















(b) Mid level reaction loop.


























Figure 3. High level reaction loop.
while ensuring conflict resolution with the minimal security
requirements. As a result of this level, a new security pol-
icy is redeployed as long as the threat or its consequences
remain present.
Figure 3 shows the different modules involved in the
high level reaction mechanism. We note that the mid level
only complies with the minimal security policy and the dif-
ferent counter measures are taken from the vision of the
attack scenario issued from the short term level while the
high level uses the global security policy and activates pol-
icy rules according to threat contexts.
5 VoIP use case
The case study we present is a VoIP framework that illus-
trates the effectiveness of our reaction process. The consid-
ered attacks are those targeting the SIP [17] (Session Initia-
tion Protocol) emerging protocol that has seen an increasing
interest from academia and industrial communities. Many
soft and hard SIP components are currently developed and
widely used by Telco operators who are offering VoIP ser-
vice mostly with little or no security issues. We give an
example for reacting against attacks targeting ISP and VoIP
infrastructures.
The architecture that we have used in our use case is the
IMS [1] framework. Many Telco operators are interested in
IMS, and even some of them had deployed it.
The architecture (see Fig. 4) is composed of different
SBCs (Session Border Controllers) that filter all the incom-
ing traffic from Internet or legitimate clients. Since SBCs
cannot filter all undesired traffic, VoIP intrusion detection
system tools, such as that developed in [3], are deployed
behind these SBCs to detect different attacks using some
vulnerabilities of the SIP protocol. Other emerging VoIP
IDSs [19], based on state machine analysis similar to previ-
ous works such as NetStat [22], may be used as a comple-
mentary IDS in our framework. Since this tool is not made











































Figure 4. Framework architecture.











Figure 5. VoIP attack scenario.
Generally, an attacker has to perform several actions in
order to achieve her goal. In our example, the attack sce-
nario is composed of 3 elementary attacks. In the first step,
the attacker tries to collect valid identities corresponding
to legitimate clients in the operator database (HSS in our
case). This attack may be omitted particularly for those
identities that are present in the red lists. However this
attack is tested in platforms of different operators and the
experiments were successful [3]. The second step consists
in guessing the password of the legitimate identity discov-
ered during the first step. The attacker sends REGISTER
messages with different passwords using a dictionary. The
http-digest mechanism is followed and according to the an-
swer, he may follow up his attack. Once the attacker has
guessed the password he may either perform a denial of ser-
vice against a server such as the P-CSCF, or against a client
by sending an infinite loop of INVITE, BYE. Notice that the
BYE request is sent when the OK response from the callee
(i.e. the target client answers to the call) is received. This
will keep the callee phone ringing and unavailable as long
as the attacker have not ceased the last attack. However,
there is no reaction that could be taken within the current
IMS framework [1].
Table 2 gives the mapping between the different logi-
cal modules we proposed in the previous sections and their
Logical modules Network component
PEP VoIP IDS, SBC, P-CSCF
REP SBC,P-CSCF
ACE CRIM Correlation engine
RDP CRIM anti-correlation engine
PDP Application server
PIE Application server
Table 2. Logical module and network compo-
nent module mapping.
corresponding network components present in our use case
framework.
We note that all the elementary attacks have been de-
tected by the VoIP IDSs [3] used in our platform. These el-
ementary attacks are collected by these IDSs and forwarded
to the CRIM-ACE for building the corresponding attack
scenario.
Using our approach, the reaction according to the three
levels workflow is described as the following:
Low level reaction. Once the directory scanning attack is
detected, the VoIP IDS sends the alert to the CRIM engine
and sends, in the mean time, a new reaction to the SBC
that consists in adding a rule for decreasing the rate of the
requests coming from (1) the IP address of the attacker if
this attacker is a client of the our ISP or (2) the couple (IP
address, the SIP Via field) when the requests originate from
a foreign ISP. This is due to the IP and logical SIP URI
spoofing reasons.
Mid-level reaction. If the attacker does not stop at the first
stage and continues towards the password guessing attack
then the corresponding scenario is constructed thanks to
the VoIP IDS alerts and the CRIM engine. At this stage, the
RDP implemented aside the CRIM engine takes a reaction
decision that consists in reconfiguring the P-CSCF in order
to stop answering the requests originating from the attacker
IP and logical addresses. The P-CSCF may stop forwarding
these requests to the concerned servers and may log these
requests for forensic analysis. One possible obligation
rule corresponding to stop forwarding the requests by the
P-CSCF is as follows:
SR(obligation, P -CSCF, stop forwarding, attacker,
password guessing threat).
High-level reaction. The attacker may have guessed the
password and starts various attacks such as disturbing other
legitimate clients by sending infinite INVITE requests fol-
lowed by the BYE method every time the target client tries
to answer. At this stage, the CRIM engine sends the whole
detected attack scenario to the application server (AS) that
plays the role of the PIE. The “DoS against a client” threat
context is activated and the corresponding abstract OrBAC
rules are generated. One possible abstract rule related to
this context is:
security rule(prohibition, attacker, request, any,
dos client threat).
The concrete rule derived from this OrBAC abstract rule
consists in blacklisting the attacker at the edge SBC.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a novel process for ex-
pressing reactions and the corresponding architecture that
aim at reacting against threats using different levels. In
the low level, reactions are configured a priori within the
security components configuration for an immediate reac-
tion. The mid level reaction tries to counter the ongoing
attack scenario by launching an appropriate counter mea-
sure. Finally, the high level reaction is performed by using
the contextual policy that builds upon the OrBAC formal-
ism. The proposed approach is robust since the different
security components are configured from a high level point
of view and the reactions against the detected threats cross
three levels for applying the best reaction issue. The use
case example we have developed and tested within a real
Telco operator demonstrates the effectiveness of our pro-
posal within the new generation networks. The different
attacks were successful against different operators’ infras-
tructures and are detectable by the VoIP IDS. The different
reactions applied at each level allowed decreasing the ef-
fects of the threat and stopping it at the last stage without
the intervention of a human security officer. Our first future
work consists in applying the different reactions in a trans-
actional mode since in some situations conflicts may occur
between the different reactions that are launched in the dif-
ferent levels. The other direction consists in considering
novel attacks within this workflow for a better reaction.
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